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ABSTRACT
We investigate how inequality a¤ects corruption and provide a new insight to the possible
channels through which such e¤ect may work. We favour an explanation based on a multi-
market framework where corruption in one market (or sector) arises because of imperfections
exacerbated by inequality in related markets. We demonstrate that even when an individuals
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t from engaging in corruption are not a¤ected by wealth level,
greater (wealth) inequality will lead to an increase in corruption.
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1 Introduction
Bureaucratic corruption, commonly dened as misuse of public o¢ ce for
private gains, is widespread in many of the developing economies typically
characterised by market imperfections of varying degrees and inequalities.
Our aim in this paper is to analytically explore how wealth inequality in the
presence of market imperfections may engender corruption.
Although empirically some recent papers have found strong causal links
from inequality to corruption (see You, 2005 and You and Khagram, 2005)
it is not obvious how such causality may work.1 Typical explanations of
the direct role of inequality in corruption relies on the phenomena of state
captureby powerful groups, according to which, in a highly unequal society
the rich will engage in corruption (or some other form of subversion of insti-
tutions) to maintain their privileged positions (Hellman et al 2000; Glaeser
et al 2003; Do 2004). As pointed out by Hellman and Kaufman (2002)
and demonstrated in Slinko et al. (2005) this explanation is more about the
inequality of inuencerather than wealth inequality per se. More impor-
tantly this explanation is predicated on the rich being more corrupt than the
others, the evidence for which is at best patchy.
We eschew such explanation in favour of one where all agents derive the
same benets from corruption and have the same abililty to pay their bribes.
This may seem to imply that the level of corruption will be independent
of the existing levels of wealth. Yet we are able to demonstrate that in a
multi-market framework it is possible for corruption to emerge or escalate in
one market (where agents produce output and pay taxes), due to the e¤ects
of wealth inequality in a related imperfect market (where agents borrow
resources to produce output).
We consider a scenario where agents (henceforth referred to as households
or rms) di¤er along two dimensions: wealth and protability/prodcutivity
of production plans. While wealth levels do not a¤ect a particular rms ex-
pected benet from bribery, less productive rms are (under some conditions)
more likely to engage in corruption. This is not an unrealistic assumption,
as Dabla-Norris et.al. (2008) in their recent study of determinants of in-
formality nd that informality is associated with less productive rms. In
1There is a small empirical literature which looks at the impact of corruption on poverty
and income inequality. See Gupta et al (2002), Li et al (2000) and Gyimah-Brempong and
Munz de Camacho (2006). There is, of course, a large literature looking at the e¤ects of
wealth inequality on growth (See Benabou (1996), Aghion-Bolton (1997)).
1
fact in our model context, there are situations where ithese rms are able to
survive in a market because they happen to be corrupt.
Wealth levels matter because rms have to borrow capital in an impre-
fect credit market. We show how informational problems coupled with the
wealth constraints in the credit market contribute to the existence of the less
productive rms. Hence, in some sense, corruption rises in the product mar-
ket because of inequality and informational problems in the credit market.
More specically, we analyse how the credit market is unable to screen out
less productive rms when some households are wealth constrained. These
rms tend to get subsidized in the credit market and benet from corruption
 thus making their operation viable and possibly protable. Since the less
productive rms are more likely to engage in corruption, their presence in
the product market determines the extent of corruption. Further, as wealth
inequality rises it leads to an increase in the level corruption by e¤ecting
the entry of less productive rms and exit of wealth constrained productive
rms.
Our paper is related to earlier work by Banerjee (1997) which also explores
the e¤ects of wealth inequality on level of equilibrium red tape. Our treat-
ment of wealth inequality is very similar but concerns and notions of corrup-
tion are di¤erent. Our paper is also related to the recent paper by Foellmi and
Oechslin (2007) which looks at the redistributive e¤ects of corruption in the
presence of credit market imperfections and wealth constraints. Credit mar-
ket su¤ers from imperfect enforcement of credit contract and hence lenders
ration the amount of credit to prevent voluntary default. The amount of
credit available to a particular agent will depend on the agents wealth level.
Thus, agents with low level of wealth may not be able to generate enough
funds to become entrepreneurs. Such market imperfections will prevent
agents from becoming entreprenuers even in the absence of any kind of cor-
ruption. We, on the other hand, consider an alternative model of credit
markets characterized by informational asymmetries and imperfect screen-
ing. Additionally, they consider non-collusive corruption and we focus on
collusive corruption.2 In collusive corruption both the bribe payer and payee
2As is well known, corruption takes various forms. Papers such as Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), Bliss and di Tella (1997) and the recent rm level studies (Svensson 2003), focus on
corruption as extortion, where agents pay bribes because of extortionary demand by the
public o¢ cials and are not the real beneciaries. In agency based models of corruption
such as Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995) both the briber and
bribee benet. There are also studies where both the features are present (Marjit et.al
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stand to benet from the corrupt act. Although corruption manifests itself
in many ways, here we only consider the problem of rms engaging in various
acts of bribery to avoid legal costs of doing their business. In this sense our
notion of a corrupt rm is very similar to the notion of informality used by
Dabla-Norris et. al. (2008) who look at the determinants of informality in a
completely di¤erent context.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe
the characteristics of di¤erent agents and how they interact strategically
in our model. Section 3 contains the results and analysis under di¤erent
scenarios. We explore the link between corruption in the product market
and imperfections in the credit market. We argue that they reinforce each
other and it may not be su¢ cient to just study one market alone in this
context. We discuss its implications for the relation between corruption
and inequality. Lastly, section 4 concludes with a discussion of the policy
implications and the limitations of our model.
2 The Model
We have three di¤erent agents who act in a strategic fashion: (a) households,
(b) inspectors and (c) banks . We describe the characteristics of each agent
below.
2.1 The Households
Households can either join the production sector (rms) or engage in some
outside option.3 They di¤er in terms of the payo¤ from their outside option.
When it comes to production, there are two types of households, (i) house-
holds with good projects (g) and (ii) households with bad projects (b). The
good projects have a higher probability of success, that is, g > b. Each
project yields Y in the successful state and zero in the failure state.4
2000, Guriev 2004). See Mishra (2005) for an analysis of the di¤erent forms of corruption.
3Our model can be interpreted as a model of occupational choice with corruption
and wealth constraints (see Acemoglu and Verdier 1998, Ghatak et al. 2008 for similar
exercises in di¤erent contaxts). The terms householdsand rmsessentially refer to the
same entities. Households in the production sector will be referred to as rms.
4It is possible to consider the case where output or prot of the b-types are lower than
that of the g-types, but it does not a¤ect our results.
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Households also di¤er in terms of their initial wealth which is private infor-
mation. Wealth inequality is captured through the existence of some wealth
constrained households. These wealth constrained households can have good
or bad projects, but to simplify the analysis we assume that these wealth con-
strained households have only good projects and denote this group as p.5 So
e¤ectively we have three groups, the rich households with good projects (g),
the poor households with good projects (p) and the rich households with the
bad projects (b). The total number of di¤erent types of households is given.
All households must borrow a certain amount say, K, from a bank.
Households staying out of the production sector do not need to borrow, and
receive some xed outside income. Households also incur several non-input
costs of running a legal business but can engage in bribery to avoid such
costs. Inspectors are supposed to ensure compliance by the rms, but they
can collude with the rm and avoid reporting. Similar to the literature on
state capture, we view corruption as collusion between o¢ cials and agents,
where both parties benet. This collusive feature of corruption is key to the
present paper.
2.2 Inspectors
Inspectors are in charge of monitoring compliance by the rms. A rm
faces a ne, F , if its non-compliance is reported. However, inspectors are
corruptible and can collude with the rm in exchange for a bribe. We
assume the corruptible inspectors constitute a certain fraction q of the total
population of inspectors.6 Hence, q stands for the scope of corruption or
corruptibility of the system.
2.3 The Banks
The banks borrow funds from the public at a xed interest factor r0, and
extend loans of xed amount K to the rms. Project returns are stochastic.
5This assumption is not restrictive and introduction of wealth constrained b-types
does not a¤ect our main result. Both these b-types behave exactly the same way in all
the equilibria that we study.
6We do not model the anti-corruption measures, hence q is taken as given. However,
increase (or decrease) in q does not e¤ect the main thrust of the results. It is possible
to model inspectors decision to be corrupt and determine q endogenously, but we have
avoided doing this to keep the analysis simple and tractable.
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Let i be the probability of success in a project undertaken by type-i house-
hold. Let ri be the interest factor paid and wi be the amount of collateral
pledged. Various types of assets, which constitute households wealth, can
serve as collateral. We assume that the bank incurs a cost, , associated
with having a collateral. If the bank can observe the types of borrowers then
for each type the bank chooses fri; wig such that the bank maximizes
i = iriK + (1  i)wi  0; (1)
where  < 1 shows the cost the banks face in keeping a collateral and 0 =
K:r0. In case the bank cannot observe the di¤erent types of borrowers, but
instead knows the distribution i (probability of a borrower being type i),
the bank maximizes
 =
X
i
i  0: (2)
We assume there is perfect competition in the banking sector, so that
the above condition is always satised with equality. We shall call it the
zero-prot condition.
2.4 Production
In addition to the standard input costs, households (rms) engaged in pro-
duction have to incur various costs in running a legitimate business. Some
of these would depend on their output or prot and some are xed in na-
ture. In many developing economies, these would take the form of costs
of compliance with various regulatory standards, quality control, safety and
labour laws. We assume that rms can avoid these costs. For example,
rms can choose to disregard pollution control, use substandard inputs, sub-
stitute adult labour with child labour. In addition to all these, rms can
of course hide output and sales to save on various sales taxes and prot tax.
In economies with high levels of compliance, rms do not have so much of a
choice and hence no strategic importance can be attached. However, these
play an important role in our model. All these non-production costs of le-
gitimate business will be denoted by T and we assume that all households
have wealth to meet these costs.7 While some components are likely to be
7This is similar to the models of informality where rms choose to place some of their
production in the informal sector to avoid these costs (see Dabla-Norris et al, 2008, Mishra
and Ray, 2010).
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incurred after output is realized, we assume that rms have to invest T before
output is realised. In some ways this discourages households from entering
the market, specially those with bad projects (as the b-types). However, in
presence of corruption, the households can bribe the inspector and end up
paying a smaller amount.
It is clear that households expected income from production will depend
on the cost of evading T and the cost of borrowingK. Depending on whether
the household incurs the legitimate cost T or not, the jth-household of type-i
will undertake production if and only if
Vij = i:(Y   ri:K)  (1  i):wi   T  V 0ij ; (3)
or
Vij = i:f(Y   ri:K) Xi)g   (1  i):wi  V 0ij ; (4)
where Vij represent the expected income of the jth-household within type-i;
Xi is the expected cost of evading T , which includes bribes and nes, and
V 0ij is the outside option available to the j
th-household of type-i. Note when
households undertakes production activities Vij = Vi, 8j 2 i. Also note that
legitimate cost T is paid ex-ante but the cost of evasion is borne ex-post.
This is an important distinction since the cost of evasion is borne ex-post,
wealth constraints would not be a deterrent for corruption.
We assume that V 0ij 2 [V ; V ] and all types have the same uniform distri-
bution over [V ; V ]. So Vi will determine what fraction of the household of
type-i will undertake production.
2.5 Equilibrium
After production has been undertaken, depending on the realization of Y ,
the rm makes a report of its income. The failure state can be viewed as
a bankruptcy state and can always be veried. If the rm declares bank-
ruptcy, the bank will verify the state and claim the value of collaterals wi.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that a rm will never declare
bankruptcy with positive output. In the successful state, the rm makes the
due repayment ri:K to the bank.
Before we begin the analysis it will be useful to summarize the sequence
of moves in the model.
1. Nature chooses the di¤erent types of the household. The households
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decide whether to undertake prodcution or not. This decision is denoted by
a 2 f0; 1g, where a = 1 refers to production activity.
2. The bank o¤ers a contract or a menu of contracts to the households
(or rms) (ri; wi).
3. The rms choose particular contracts.
4. Firms choose l 2 f0; 1g, where l = 1 refers to rms decision to incur
the cost T (and not engage in corruption). Once the output is realized, rm
repays the bank according to the agreed contract.
5. Inspection is carried out by the inspectors. Corrupt inspectors can
collude with the rm.
6. Following the inspectors report, all bribes or nes are paid.
For convenience, we shall label stages 2-3 as the credit market game and
stages 4-6 as the bribe game. Since these are inter-linked, the outcome in
the bribe game will determine the outcome in the credit market. We shall
be looking at equilibria satisfying backward induction.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is dened as a tuple faij; li; (ri; wi)g such that
given householdsdecision, the credit market is in equilibrium and given the
credit contracts (ri; wi) each households decision is optimal.
An equilibrium in the game stages 2-7 will induce a unique outcome on
households entry decisions. We shall nd it convenient to describe house-
holds choice to enter, by the participation rate of each type of household 
denoted by i. It represents the fraction of households of type-i entering
production sector. Then given i, we can calculate the distribution of dif-
ferent types in the credit market as i = (Nii)=
P
Nii where Ni refers to
the number of type i households in the population, i = g; b; p. Notice that
both the total number of rms entering production and the number of rms
choosing evasion and bribery will be determined in equilibrium.
3 Results and Analysis
3.1 Bribe Game
For the purpose of tracking how wealth inequality transmits from the credit
market through to corruption in the product market, we shall intentionally
keep our bribe game simple. We assume that all rms are inspected. If
7
a rm decides not to incur the cost T , it can then be apprehended by an
inspector and be subject a ne F . We shall assume that a non-compliant
rm if caught has to forgo net output. Hence Fi = (Y   riK): This could
be interpreted as a situation where a rm ceases to operate once its illegal
behavior is detected. In that case only rms with lower expected protability
are likely to take the risk of being illegal.
However, recall that q proportion of the inspectors are corrupt. A corrupt
inspector can always collude with the rm and not report the non-compliance
in exchange for a bribe. The bribe amount obviously will depend on the
relative bargaining powers between the inspector and the rms. Without
going in to the actual bribe determination process, we take bribe to be pro-
portional to the ne. Denoting (Y   riK) as Zi, bribe di = Zi.8 We also
assume limited liability which implies that nes can not be collected from
non-successful rms. Hence, using (3) and (4), a rm will choose l = 0 if and
only if
i: (qZi + (1  q)Zi)  T (5)
Or,
i <
T
(1  q(1  )):Zi = (T; q; Zi) = i: (6)
Remark 1 There is a critical success rate , such that all rms with i  
will evade T and engage in corruption.
Note that  is type specic because it depends on Zi, which in turn will
depend on the credit market outcome.9 From (6) it is clear that for a given
i, a high ri and consequently a lower Zi, will increase the possibility that a
type will be corrupt.
Since T is xed and rms have limited liabilities, all rms have the same
amount of benet from evasion and are able to pay the required amount of
bribes. This avoids any direct role of inequality in corruption as has been
our intention in this paper. But, because nes or bribes are paid ex-post,
the rm with a lower successful probability faces a lower expected cost (nes
and bribes) and hence is more likely to be corrupt.10
8This can be interpreted as the outcome of a game where the inspector makes a take-it-
or-leave-it proposal with probability  and the rm can accept or reject. The rm makes
a similar o¤er with probability (1  ).
9Our working paper considers various formulations. If F is xed then the critical success
rate is independent of Zi: On the other hand the present formulation can be generalised
to consider a lump sum tax T and a proportional tax on prots (tZi).
10In much of the analysis we use the number of rms that chooses l = 0 as a measure of
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3.2 Credit Market
Before we discuss the credit market outcome, it is useful to consider the
benchmark case where there is complete information about the type of projects.
Recall that banks have no information about the wealth of the households,
hence they can not distinguish between the rich good type (g-type) and poor
good type (p-type). We shall assume that the level of wealth does not a¤ect
a households need to borrow K or income streams Y .11
3.2.1 Complete Information Benchmark
Given positive collateral cost, 1 >  > 0; it is easy to see that under complete
information there is no need for collateral.
[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 shows the iso-prot curves and indi¤erence curves (Vi) of the di¤er-
ent types of households in the rw plane. Given that b < g, the b-type
households have a steeper indi¤erence curve. The dotted lines show the zero
prot lines for the bank. Since 1 >  > 0; the households indi¤erence curve
is steeper than the banks indi¤erence curve.
Let superscript c denotes the outcome under complete information. The
net income Zci of the di¤erent types in the successful state would be (Y rciK),
where rci is the interest rate the i types pay in the complete information case.
Clearly, Zcb < Z
c
g. Hence, from (6), one can show that for the bribe game,
the critical success rates of the b-types are higher than the g-types, that is,
cg < 
c
b. Therefore, if g < 
c
g, all rms choose the illegal course of action.
On the other hand if cb < b then none of rms will be corrupt. Although
such extreme cases may be plausible, our focus is on the in between scenario
where only the b-types engage in corruption, which will be the case if the
following condition holds. We shall assume that
b < 
c
g < 
c
b < g: (7)
corruption. In earlier versions of the paper we have considered other indicators like size
of bribes.
11A natural interpretation of this wealth would be various assets which can not be
subsititued directly for capital in the production process but households could borrow
money against these.
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We shall also assume that some g-types always enter. Participation rates are
given by ci =
V ci  V
V
; where V = V   V ; 1  i  0: We assume that
V cg = gZ
c
g   T > V : (8)
Proposition 1 In the complete information case, rcg = r
c
p < r
c
b and 1 
cg = 
c
p > 
c
b  0. Corruption facilitates the entry of b-types without any
distorting e¤ects on the g and p-types.
Proof. (Sketch only) It is clear from Figure 1 that contracts D and E
will be o¤ered in equilibrium. Firms with a good projects will be o¤ered
contract E (lower interest rate) and rms with a bad projects will be o¤ered
D (higher interest rate). Banks zero-proft condition is satised. Since
D does not require any collateral, wealth constraints do not matter and
cg = 
c
p > 0: Condition (7) guranatees that b-types will evade T and engage
in bribery whenever apprehended by an honest inspector. However, this
does not guarantee that corruption will take place in equilibrium. That
depends on whether the b-types will enter production in the rst place, that
is, whether
V cb = b[Z
c
b   f(1  q)Zcb + qZcbg] > V . (9)
Moreover, it can be veried that V cb < V
c
g implying 
c
g = 
c
p > 
c
b:
Suppose V cb = V and 
c
b > b, then a rise in the number of corrupt
inspectors (rise in q) would facilitate entry by the b-types by raising V cb .
The number of bribe paying rms will rise as the b-types are going to avoid
T . Since V cg (or V
c
p ) is una¤ected, there is no change in particpation of the
g-types.
3.2.2 Incomplete Information
Next, we study the case where the bank can not identify the di¤erent types.
A bank can use the two instruments, r and w, at its disposal to screen the
di¤erent types. Due to the presence of p-type rms the standard screening
outcome of the credit market, where all three di¤erent types are completely
separated, is not feasible.12 This is because in any separating outcome, the
g-type will have to put up some collateral, but since the p-types are collateral
constrained, the bank is forced to o¤er them a contract with no collateral.
12See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for various screening models in the credit market.
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We have assumed the credit market to be competitive, even though we do
not model the competition between banks in an explicit manner. The banks
zero prot condition is satised in equilibrium and there is no contract that
the bank can deviate to and make positive prot. Using superscript s to
denote the outcome under incomplete information, V si represent the expected
income of type-i and si = (V
s
i   V )=V:
Recall that the probability that a borrower belongs to type-i household
undertaking production is given by i where
i =
siNiP
i 
s
iNi
; i = g; p; b (10)
Consider the outcome where all three types are pooled. Let r be the interest
rate where all three types are pooled and the banks zero prot condition is
met. It is given by the following
r =
0
(g + p)g + bb

K
: (11)
Point G in Figure 1 refers to this interest rate. Likewise, consider an outcome
where the b and p-types pool but the g-types are seprated. In such a semi-
separating equilibrium the pooled interest rate (partial pooling of) is given
by
r =
0
(pg + bb)K
; (12)
where i represents the proportion of type-i engaged in production and ac-
cepting the pooled contract under the semi-separating equilibrium; i =
i=(b+ p); i = b; p. Comparing (11) and (12), it is easy to see that r > r.
Before we state the next Proposition, it would bee useful to consider the
following two denitions.
Let 0 be the success probability of the b-type such that the b-type with
lowest outside option is indi¤erent between entering production and not when
o¤ered the complete information interest rate.
0[Zb   f(1  q)Zb + qZbg] = V , where Zb = Y   rcgK:
Likewise, let 1 is the success probability of the b-type which makes the
g type is indi¤erent between the grand pooling outcome (11) and the semi-
separating outcome (12).
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Proposition 2 (i) Let b < 0; credit market equilibrium is given by the
complete information contract E, sb = 0; 
s
g = 
s
p = 
c
p = 
c
g: (ii) Let 1 >
b > 0; there exists a semi-separating screening equilibrium [frg ; wgg; fr; 0g]
where the b and p types pool at rand g type separates at frg ; wgg. We have
sb > 
c
b; 
s
g  cg; sp  cp, and sg > sp: (iii)Let b > 1; the only equilib-
rium in the credit market is the pooling equilibrium r where all three types
are pooled and sb > 
c
b; 
s
g = 
s
p  cg:
Proof. (Sketch only) It is clear from Figure 1, that in the incomplete
information case the contract pair (D;E) is not incentive compatible and
all types would choose E: However, if b < 0; the b-types still nd it non-
protable to enter. Hence in equilibrium contract E is o¤ered, sb = 0:
For b > 0; b-types will nd it protable to enter. Now, a semi-separating
equilibrium is possible, where the g-types are separated out and the b and
p-types pool. Contract pair (rg ; w

g) and (r
; 0) (represented by B and A
respectively), is o¤ered. The g-types chooses contract B and the p and b-
types pool at A. Note that the b-types have no incentive to deviate from A
to B: The p-types cannot deviate to any contract with w > 0. Moreover,
the g-types also have no incentive to deviate to A: It is easy to show that
(rg ; w

g) is given by the incentive compatible condition for b-type,
wg =
b(r
   rg)K
1  b
; (13)
and the zero prot condition of the bank,
gr

gK + (1  g)wg = 0. (14)
The semi-separating contract pair, (rg ; w

g) and (r
; 0), will indeed be an
equilibrium if a bank can not deviate and o¤er a pooled contract fetching
non-negative prot.13 Such deviations can be ruled out if the pooled interest
rate G lies above the point H, since in that case the g-types will not prefer
the pooled contract. Comparing with the complete information case, the
b-types are better o¤ and their participation increases. For the g types
V sb > V
c
b and V
s
g < V
c
g . It can be shown that V
c
p   V sp > V cg   V sg : In other
words, the loss in income is much higher for the p-types compared to the
13Since the distribution of types itself is equilibrium determined (through ), the ana-
lytical conditions are very messy. We have chosen to present a numerical example (later
in this section) to show the equilibrium construct and its properties.
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g-types. More b-types will enter the market at the cost of mostly p-types.
The weak inequalities in the participation rates follow from the possibility
that if we have V sg > V ; V
s
p > V then despite the fall in expected payo¤,
the participation rates (of g and p-types respectively) can remain the same
at sg = 
s
p = 1.
For higher values of b(as bapproaches g) the pooled interest rate given
by point G moves closer to E: Let 1be the value of b such that G = H:
Clearly, for b > 1;the semi-seprating outcome ceases to be an equilibrium.
The pooled outcome given by r (11) and denoted by G is the only equilib-
rium. This is where the b-types are subsidized the most and sb > 
c
b: In
this equilibrium wealth constraints do not matter as all types pay the same
interest rate.
Which of the groups will engage in corruption will depend on what hap-
pens to sb, 
s
g and 
s
p. For the g-types, since Z
s
g > Z
c
g, we have 
s
g < 
c
g and
they will not engage in corruption since they were not doing so in the com-
plete information case. On the other hand, for the p-types since Zsp < Z
c
p, (6)
implies that sp > 
c
p = 
c
g. Although in the complete information case the
p-types were not paying any bribes, now there is a possibility they might do
so if, sp > p > 
c
p. This condition, however, will fail to hold in presence of
(7), which is b < 
c
g < 
c
b < g. This is because the lowest possible income
is earned by the b-types under complete information, that is Zcb < Z
s
p < Z
s
g
which using (6) leads to cb > 
s
p > 
s
g. Given (7), it must then be the case
that g = p > 
c
b > 
s
p > 
s
g. Hence, in our framework the p-types and
the g-types do not engage in corruption under the incomplete information
scenario.
For the b-types, Zsb > Z
c
b implies, from (6), that 
s
b < 
c
b. Hence there
could arise a possibility that b-types do not engage in corruption if sb <
b < 
c
b. As before, this case can be ruled out since (7) holds. We know
that since Zcg, the g-types income under the complete information scenario, is
the highest possible income that rms in this economy can achieve, therefore
Zsb < Z
c
g. Hence, using (6), it must be the case that 
s
b > 
c
g > b. Therefore
the b-types will continue to choose l = 0.
Since more b-types enter the market the number of rms in equilibrium
opting for the illegal route, and as a consequence bribery, will rise. This
would imply that the level of corruption as measured by the ratio of corrupt
rms to the total number of rms will be higher. We summarize the previous
discussion in the following.
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Corollary 1 Suppose b < cg < 
c
b < g and b > 0:Under incomplete
information and wealth inequality, corruption is higher in equilibrium as a
larger fraction of the total rms will engage in bribery.
Example Consider an economy with Nb = 6000; Np = 1200; Ng = 517.
Let K = 20; 0 = 20;  = 1=2; b = 1=4; g = 1=2; Y = 200; T = 20: For
the bribe game, let q = 1=2;  = 1=7 . For simplicity consider penalty to
be xed F = 77: Using (6) it is clear that b = g = p = 0:45, hence only
b-types will nd it protable to evade T . The expected payments (bribe
with probability q and ne F with probability (1  q)) is 41:25. Recall that
these payments are made only in the successful state. The support of the
outside options is given by V = 20; V = 60: For the complete information
case, using (1), and (9) it is easy to check that rcg = 2; r
c
b = 4 and V
c
g = 60;
V cb = 20. Using the expressions for , we can show that 
c
g = 
c
p = 1 and
cb = 0. Hence, despite the presence of corruption prone rms there will be
no corruption in equilibrium.
Now consider the semi-separating outcome. It is given by rg = 28=15;
wg = 16=3 and r
 = 8=3: This leads to participation rates sg = (5:8=6);
sp = 5=6 and 
s
b = 1=6: As expected, the p-types participation rate falls by
1=6. Using (10)-(14), it can be checked that this constitutes an equilibrium.
Given the participation rates we can solve for the following distribution of
types p = b = 2=5 and g = 1=5 (since i = (iNi)=
P
iNi). The zero
prot condition (2), and (14) for the banks is satised. If a bank were to
deviate and o¤er a completely pooled contract (while still earning zero prot),
the corresponding interest rate ( 11) will be 5=2: However, at this interest
rate, the g-types earn an expected payo¤ of 55 which is lower than their
equilibrium payo¤ of 58:66. Hence such a deviation will not be successful.
In this equilibrium, 40 percent of the rms will be engaging in evasion and
bribery. Therefore, compared to the complete information case, there is an
increase in corrupt activities.
3.2.3 Changes in Inequality
Changes in inequality matters in our model to the extent it a¤ects the pro-
portion of wealth constrained households Np relative to other households Nb,
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Ng.14 Since total number of households and total wealth remain same, all
changes in inequality can be seen as resulting frommean preserving spreads.15
Consider a redistribution such that Nb stays the same, Ng falls and Np rises
with Ng +Np remaining same.16 This change in type distribution of house-
holds (g type and p type) will a¤ect the equilibrium outcome and partici-
pation rates of di¤erent types of households. Given that households di¤er in
terms of bribing behaviour, level of corruption will also be a¤ected.
The e¤ect of redistribution will also depend on the nature of credit mar-
ket equilibrium. If g-types and p-types are being treated in identical fasion
(Cases (i) and (iii) in Proposition 2) then the redistribution described above
will have no impact. In both cases ((i) and (iii)) the equilibrium depends
on the total number good households, not their distribution in terms of con-
strained (p-type) or unconstrained (g type). However, in the semi-seprating
equilibrium, the p-types have a lower participation than the g type and the
equilibrium conguration depends on the distribution of households. It is
clear that following a redistribution of the kind described above, the equi-
librium interest rate r will fall and the separating contract for the g-type
(rg ; w

g) will also change. Before we state the proposition, let us consider the
numerical example.
Example (contd.) Consider the previous example and the semi-separating
equilibrium. Now consider a redistribution of wealth so that the number of
wealth constrained households goes up. Let Nb = 6000; Np = 1717; Ng = 0.
Since only wealth constrained p-types and unconstrained b-types are present,
the new equilibrium will be a simple pooling equilibrium with r = 5=2:
The participation rates will be higher for both types; sp = 5:2=6 and 
s
b =
3=16: Comparing the number of rms before and after the redistribution,
the number of b-types engaged in production goes up from 1000 to 1125 and
the number p-types and g-types engaged in production falls from 1500 to
1488. Since, by assumption, the b-types engage in corruption the level of
corruption goes up following the redistribution. The following Proposition
formalizes this idea.
14This feature is likely to be present whenever cash or wealth constraints are the main
drivers of imperfections (see Banerjee,1997).
15We thank a referee for pointing this out.
16This can be achieved in several ways. We could (i) redistribute wealth from some
wealthy g-types to b-types or (ii) redistribute wealth from some wealthy g-types to other
wealthy g-types. Our results do not depend on the underlying distribution process.
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Proposition 3 Consider the semi-seprating equilibrium described in Propo-
sition 2. As the fraction of poor households increases following a rise in
wealth inequality, more b-type rms enter the production sector and some
g-type rms leave. This leads to a rise in the proportion of corrupt rms in
the market.
Proof. First, given the pre-redistribution participation rates, rise in Np
will lead to a rise in p and fall in b. Since g > b, it is clear that (using
(12)) r will fall. Consequently, frg ; wgg will also change. Following a fall
in r payo¤s to all the three types (V sg ; V
s
p ; V
s
b ) will rise. It can be veried
that
dV si
dr
< 0; i = g; p; b and
dV sgdr
 < dV sbdr
 : (15)
So there will be an increase in the participation rates for each type (whenever
feasible).
The e¤ect on the market outcome depends on the pre-distribution partic-
ipation rates. Suppose, prior to redistribution, sg = 1; 
s
p = 1 and 
s
b > 0.
In such case, there will be no change in the participation rates of house-
holds with good projects and only the number of bad projects increases in
equilibrium.
On the other hand, consider a case where prior to redistribution 1  sg >
sp > 
s
b > 0. Let e denote the participation rates in the new equilibrium andeN be the post-distribution numbers of di¤erent households in the economy.
Let Ng   eNg = eNp   Np = n. The change in the total number of good
projects (ng +np) entering production will be given by
ng +np = ( eNg)(eg   sg) + (Np)(ep   sp) n(sg   ep), (16)
where the rst term (in the right hand side) shows the increase in the number
of g-types who remained rich; the second term indicates the increase in the
number of p-types and the last term accounts for the g-types who had exited
once they became poor. It can be shown that ng +np < 0. 17
Hence there will be more b-types. Given (7) and the arguments preceding
Corrollary 1, there will be more bribe paying and fewer abiding households
in the production sector.
Remark 2 Note that b-type households and bribe paying households or extent
17The details are in our working paper version, available upon request.
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of corruption are identical in much of the analysis. As Zb (or more precisely
Vb) increases following a fall in the pooled rate, b also falls and b < g < b
may not hold any more. Following a rise in Zb; the b-types might choose to
abide and corruption will reduce to zero. It can be shown that if we raise the
Z or V of all types, corruption can be reduced. This might suggest that our
model of the link between inequality and corruption relates experience of low
income countries (with lower Z or V )
Remark 3 We have considered only the proportion of corrupt rms as a
measure of corruption. As mentioned earlier, we could use the total amount
of bribes paidas another measure. To the extent (7) holds and only b-type
rms are always corrupt, both the measures move in the same direction in all
the previous propositions. Since the participation of b-types can only increase
following a rise in Zb, and the size of bribe is given by di = Zi; this implies
that the total amount of bribes paid also goes up.
4 Conclusion
Our objective was to provide a rationale for the causal link from inequality to
corruption. We have done that using a multi-market framework where the
presence of wealth inequality in the credit market prevents the screening of
the e¢ cient rms from the ine¢ cient rms, thus allowing ine¢ cient rms to
enter the market, bringing corruption in its wake. We do not wish to claim
that our approach provides the only explanation linking inequality to corrup-
tion. Although there may exist other possibilities, our approach, provides
a plausible explanation of how corruption is a¤ected by wealth inequality
even when an individuals ability and willingness to engage in corruption is
not directly a¤ected by the persons wealth. Since bribe are paid ex post
(after the project returns are realized) a poor household can also a¤ord to
pay bribes and the benet from corruption to the household depends on its
e¢ ciency type but not the level of wealth. We feel that this makes our analy-
sis more interesting since there is no obvious reason why wealth inequality
should matter so far as corruption is concerned.
Our model can be extended in couple of other directions. First, an ob-
vious question is how the poor households are a¤ected by the presence of
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corruption. Even though poor households can benet and can engage in cor-
ruption to the same extent as the rich, our model shows that some of these
poor households (the wealth constrained households with good projects) are
adversely a¤ected because of credit market imperfections. Recall that as
more households with bad projects enter the more these poor households
are adversely a¤ected. Second, one can also address the issue of the link
between corruption and competition in the presence of wealth inequality and
market imperfections.18 We have left these issues for future research.
The multi-market orientation of our model can lead to a somewhat dif-
ferent focus so far as policy implications are concerned. It shows that policy
intervention crucially depends on the nature of outcomes in related markets:
for instance, intervention in the credit market, will depend on the extent
of corruption. Likewise, anti-corruption policies have to be evaluated in
the light of the credit market outcomes. In general, anti-corruption policy
analysis takes a partial equilibrium approach and focuses on the same market
where corruption takes place. In the present case that would mean raising
inspection probability or the ne, and reduce the incentive for inspectors to
be corrupt. Our paper, complementary to this approach, would point also
in the direction of the credit market. As seen in our numerical example,
elimination of imperfections in the credit market can eliminate corruption
by preventing the entry of the corruption prone rms. This, we consider,
is an important point to bear in mind while designing policies especially
in developing countries where more than one market exhibit various kinds
of imperfections. This view in a wider context is not new, but is worth
emphasizing in the context of corruption.
18See Ades and Di Tella (1999), Bliss and di Tella (1997), La¤ont and NGuessan (1999)
for studies focusing on this issue.
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Figure 1: Equilibria in the credit market with g, p, and b-types 
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